

CLASSICAL VERIFICATION OF QUANTUM COMPUTATIONS

COL872: Lattices in CS

Anish Banerjee

Shankh Gupta

Based on the [Mah23] of the same name



HISTORY

[Got04] : Is it possible for an efficient classical verifier to verify the output of an efficient quantum prover?

$IP = PSPACE$ and $BQP \subseteq PSPACE$
 $\Rightarrow BQP \subseteq IP$

But prover in IP is all powerful!

Can we work with an **efficient quantum prover**?

[BFK09] [FK17] [ABOE08] [ABOEM17]



[RUV12]



Main Results (Informal)

LWE is hard for a BQP machine




There exists an **extended trapdoor claw-free family**.



All decision problems in BQP can be verified by an efficient classical machine through interaction.

Trapdoor Claw-free functions

$f_{k,0}, f_{k,1} : D \rightarrow R$
Injective, same range




Hard to find a **claw** (x_0, x_1) such that $f_{k,0}(x_0) = f_{k,1}(x_1)$ without td .

Also satisfies two other **hardcore bit** properties

Trapdoor Injective Functions

$g_{k,0}, g_{k,1} : D \rightarrow R$
Injective, **disjoint** range



Given $y = g_{k,b}(x)$, hard to find (b,x) without td.

ETCF = TCF + TIF + Injective Invariance

Hard to distinguish
between (f_0, f_1) and (g_0, g_1)

(A blue curved arrow points from this text up towards the 'Injective Invariance' part of the equation above.)

Relation to this course



ETCFs are built using LWE.



Extensively used in the construction of several verification protocols.



However, we only have **approximate constructions**.



We want to study these constructions and understand why we don't have exact.

Hadamard & Standard Basis Measurements

$$|\psi\rangle = \alpha_0|0\rangle + \alpha_1|1\rangle = \alpha_0 \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} + \alpha_1 \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha_0 \\ \alpha_1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Standard Basis

Obtain b with probability $|\alpha_b|^2$

Hadamard Basis

$$H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$H|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha_0 + \alpha_1)|0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\alpha_0 - \alpha_1)|1\rangle$$

Obtain b with probability $\frac{1}{2} |\alpha_0 + (-1)^b \alpha_1|^2$

Classical Notion of Verification




Verifier

Reduce the problem
into a 3-SAT instance ϕ

Asks for a satisfying assignment



Assignment τ



Verify that τ satisfies
the instance ϕ



Prover
(unbounded)

Quantum Analogue of NP



Verifier

Reduce the problem to a
Local Hamiltonian H .

Asks for a ground state



Sends n -qubit quantum state ρ



Verify that ρ has low energy w.r.t. H



Prover

- [BL08] H , S measurements are sufficient to estimate energy.
- [MF16] Using H, S measurements, we can verify results of any BQP computation

Measurement Protocol

Goal: Force the prover to behave as the verifier's trusted measurement device



Ideal Functionality



Verifier

Constructs an n -qubit state ρ

Chooses either H/S
basis measurement for each qubit

Outputs measurement result of ρ
in the chosen basis




Prover

Soundness:

If the verifier accepts, there exists *a quantum state independent of the verifier's measurement choice* underlying the measurement results

Using Measurement Protocol for Verification

- The measurement protocol implements the following model :



- Prover sends n -qubit state ρ and verifier measures the state.
- We can show that quantum computations can be verified in the above model.

Measurement Protocol Outline



Verifier

Verifier chooses either H/S basis for each qubit

Sends (f_0, f_1) or (g_0, g_1) for each qubit

Sends measurement results $\{y_i\}_{i \in [n]}$

Requests a H/S basis measurement

Response



Prover

Hadamard Basis Measurement



Sample $(f_0, f_1, td) \leftarrow \text{TCF.Setup}()$

Computes $x_{0,y}$ & $x_{1,y}$ using td

f_0, f_1



Chooses $|\psi\rangle = \alpha_0 |0\rangle + \alpha_1 |1\rangle$

Apply f_0, f_1 (in superposition) on state $|\psi\rangle$

$$|\psi_1\rangle = \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \alpha_b |b\rangle |x\rangle |f_b(x)\rangle$$

Measure the final register, obtaining $y \in \mathcal{Y}$

$$|\psi_2\rangle = \alpha_0 |0\rangle |x_{0,y}\rangle + \alpha_1 |1\rangle |x_{1,y}\rangle$$

$y \leftarrow f_b(x)$

Hadamard Basis Measurement (cont.)



$$m \leftarrow b' \oplus d \cdot (x_{0,y} \oplus x_{1,y})$$

d, b'



Applies Hadamard Transform and measures the pre-image register obtaining d

$$X^{d \cdot (x_{0,y} \oplus x_{1,y})} H |\psi\rangle$$

Finally, perform measurement in the Standard basis to obtain b'

Standard Basis Measurement



Sample $(g_0, g_1, td) \leftarrow \text{TIF.Setup}()$

Computes b & $x_{b,y}$ using td

g_0, g_1




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Apply g_0, g_1 (in superposition) on state $|\psi\rangle$

$$|\psi_1\rangle = \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \alpha_b |b\rangle |x\rangle |g_b(x)\rangle$$

Measure the final register, obtaining $y \in \mathcal{Y}$

$$|b\rangle |x_{b,y}\rangle$$


$y \leftarrow g_b(x)$



Conclusion

- Verifiable, secure delegation of quantum computations is possible with a classical machine
- Rely on quantum secure Trapdoor claw-free functions (from Learning with Errors).

THANK
YOU



quick question

Irina Blok